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 OPINION 
                     
 
 
COWEN, Circuit Judge. 
 
 
 Brenda L. Healey appeals the order of the district 
court granting Southwood Psychiatric Hospital's motion for 
summary judgment on her sex discrimination claim brought under 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, codified as amended at 
42 U.S.C. §2000e et. seq.  Because we find that Southwood has 
established a bona-fide occupational qualification defense to 
Healey's Title VII claim, we will affirm the order of the 
district court. 
    
I. 
 The following facts are not substantially disputed. 
Healey was hired as a child care specialist at Southwood in 
October 1987.  In this capacity, she was responsible for 
developing and maintaining a therapeutic environment for the 
children and adolescents hospitalized at Southwood.  Southwood's 
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patients are emotionally disturbed, and some have been sexually 
abused.  In November 1992, Healey was assigned to the night shift 
at Southwood as a result of a staff reorganization.  The 
reorganization was necessitated by reason of a decline in the 
patient population.  The night shift is a less desirable shift, 
requiring more housekeeping chores and less patient interaction 
and responsibility.   
 Southwood has a policy of scheduling both males and 
females to all shifts, and considers sex in making its 
assignments. In November 1992, Southwood assigned Healey to the 
night shift because it needed a female child care specialist on 
that shift. Southwood maintains that its gender-based policy is 
necessary to meet the therapeutic needs and privacy concerns of 
its mixed-sex patient population.  Healey counters that gender 
should not play  any role in the hiring and scheduling of 
employees, and Southwood's actions towards her constitute sex 
discrimination in violation of Title VII.  The district court 
granted Southwood's motion for summary judgment from which Healey 
appeals. 
 
II. 
 The district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§1331, and we exercise appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1291.  "When reviewing an order granting summary 
judgment we exercise plenary review and apply the same test the 
district court should have applied."  Armbruster v. Unisys Corp., 
32 F.3d 768, 777 (3d Cir. 1994).  Under Federal Rule of Civil 
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Procedure 56(c), that test is whether there is a genuine issue of 
material fact and, if not, whether the moving party is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law.  In so deciding, the court must 
view the facts in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party 
and draw all reasonable inferences in that party's favor.  Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 56(c). 
 
III. 
A. 
 In bringing a Title VII sex-discrimination claim, two 
different theories of liability are available to the plaintiff: 
disparate treatment and disparate impact.  The disparate 
treatment theory can be further subdivided into two subtheories: 
facial discrimination and pretextual discrimination.  See Reidt 
v. County of Trempealeau, 975 F.2d 1336, 1341 (7th Cir. 1992) 
(distinguishing between a facially discriminatory employment 
policy and a "pretextual" disparate treatment case); In re Pan 
American World Airways, Inc., 905 F.2d 1457, 1460 (11th Cir. 
1990); see generally, RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ACTS, § 
9.03 (3d ed. 1995).  A different affirmative defense may be 
offered to counter each of these theories of liability.  In a 
disparate treatment case, the defendant's affirmative defense is 
that its policy, practice, or action is based on a "Bona-Fide 
Occupational Qualification," ("BFOQ").  In a disparate impact 
case, on the other hand, the appropriate defense is that of 
business necessity.  See International Union, United Auto., 
Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers, UAW v. Johnson Controls, 
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Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 198-200, 111 S. Ct. 1196, 1203-04 (1991) 
(noting different applications of BFOQ and business necessity 
defenses and holding that BFOQ defense, not the business 
necessity defense, is appropriate standard for disparate 
treatment cases); see also Grant v. General Motors Corp., 908 
F.2d 1303, 1307 (6th Cir. 1990) ("overt discrimination and the 
statutorily-defined BFOQ defense must be analytically 
distinguished from Griggs-type disparate impact and the 
accompanying judicially-created business necessity defense"). 
 The district court did not address Healey's disparate 
impact claim in dismissing her complaint.  Healey argues both 
disparate treatment and disparate impact theories are applicable 
to her case.  We disagree that disparate impact is applicable. 
Southwood uses sex as an explicit factor in assigning its staff 
to the various shifts, and Healey was assigned to the night shift 
because of her sex.  Under a disparate impact theory, liability 
is established when a facially neutral policy affects members of 
a protected class in a significantly discriminatory manner.  
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329, 97 S. Ct. 2720, 2726-27 
(1977). Here, Southwood's staffing policy is facially 
discriminatory,1 rather than facially neutral.  Analysis under 
                                                           
1Judge Sarokin would describe Southwood's scheduling policy as 
"facially gender-based" rather than "facially discriminatory" for 
the following reason.  Use of the term "discriminatory" connotes 
that the policy is "characterized by or exhibiting prejudices, 
racial bias, or the like," The Random House College Dictionary 
379 (revised ed. 1980); it connotes intent.  Because the court 
concludes that Southwood's policy is motivated not by a 
discriminatory intent but by a bona fide occupational 
qualification, Judge Sarokin believes that referring to the 
policy as "discriminatory" is inappropriate. 
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disparate impact is not appropriate where plaintiff claims injury 
based on a facially discriminatory policy.  Reidt v. County of 
Trempealeau, 975 F.2d 1336, 1340 (7th Cir. 1992). Therefore, 
since this case involves a facially discriminatory employment 
policy, not a facially neutral one, disparate impact is not 
appropriate to this case. 
 On Healey's disparate treatment claim, the district 
court applied the shifting burdens of proof under McDonnell 
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817 (1973), and 
concluded that Healey had failed to establish that Southwood's 
BFOQ defense was pretextual.  However, Southwood's gender-based 
policy is not a pretext for discrimination--it is per se 
intentional discrimination.  This type of disparate treatment 
case should be distinguished from the more typical disparate 
treatment case, pretextual discrimination, where the familiar 
procedure set forth in McDonnell Douglas is appropriate.  The 
McDonnell Douglas test is inapt in this case which involves a 
facially discriminatory policy. See Reidt v. County of 
Trempealeau, 975 F.2d 1336, 1341 (7th Cir. 1992)(noting 
distinction between "facial" disparate treatment cases and 
"pretextual" disparate treatment cases); In re Pan American World 
Airways, Inc., 905 F.2d 1457, 1460 (11th Cir. 1990) (same); 
Chambers v. Omaha Girls Club, Inc., 834 F.2d 697, 704 n.18 (8th 
Cir. 1987) (per se intentional discrimination eliminates the 
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting procedure).  
 Without using the McDonnell Douglas shifting burdens of 
proof, Healey may still establish sex discrimination under Title 
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VII.  In fact, Healey has shown sex discrimination by 
establishing the existence of a facially discriminatory 
employment policy. Title VII expressly states that "[it] shall be 
an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to 
discriminate against any individual with respect to [her] 
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, 
because of such individual's . . . sex[.]"  42 U.S.C. § 2000(e).  
Thus, Title VII sets forth a sweeping prohibition against overt 
gender-based discrimination in the workplace.  See, e.g., City of 
Los Angeles Dep't of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 98 
S. Ct. 1370 (1978).  When open and explicit use of gender is 
employed, as is the case here, the systematic discrimination is 
in effect "admitted" by the employer, and the case will turn on 
whether such overt disparate treatment is for some reason 
justified under Title VII.  See RODNEY A. SMOLLA, supra, at 
§9.03[6][a].  A justification for overt discrimination may exist 
if the disparate treatment is part of a legally permissible 
affirmative action program, or based on a BFOQ.  Id. 
 Southwood asserts that its gender-based staffing policy 
is justified as a bona fide occupational qualification, and 
therefore is exempt under Title VII.  Under the BFOQ defense, 
overt gender-based discrimination can be countenanced if sex "is 
a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to 
the normal operation of [a] particular business or enterprise[.]"  
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1).  The BFOQ defense is written narrowly, 
and the Supreme Court has read it narrowly.  See Johnson 
Controls, 499 U.S. at 201, 111 S. Ct. at 1204.  The Supreme Court 
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has interpreted this provision to mean that discrimination is 
permissible only if those aspects of a job that allegedly require 
discrimination fall within the "'essence' of the particular 
business."  Id. at 206, 111 S. Ct. at 1207.  Alternatively, the 
Supreme Court has stated that sex discrimination "is valid only 
when the essence of the business operation would be undermined" 
if the business eliminated its discriminatory policy.  Dothard v. 
Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 332, 97 S. Ct. 2720, 2729 (1977) 
(quoting Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 
388 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950, 92 S. Ct. 275 
(1971)).   
 The employer has the burden of establishing the BFOQ 
defense.  Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 200, 111 S. Ct. at 1204. 
The employer must have a "basis in fact" for its belief that no 
members of one sex could perform the job in question.  Dothard, 
433 U.S. at 335, 97 S. Ct. at 2730.  However, appraisals need not 
be based on objective, empirical evidence, and common sense and 
deference to experts in the field may be used.  See id. (relying 
on expert testimony, not statistical evidence, to determine BFOQ 
defense); Torres v. Wisconsin Dep't Health and Social Servs., 859 
F.2d 1523, 1531-32 (8th Cir. 1988)(in establishing a BFOQ 
defense, defendants need not produce objective evidence, but 
rather employer's action should be evaluated on basis of totality 
of circumstances as contained in the record), cert. denied, 489 
U.S. 1017, 109 S. Ct. 1133, and 489 U.S. 1082, 109 S. Ct. 1537 
(1989). The employer must also demonstrate that it "could not 
reasonably arrange job responsibilities in a way to minimize a 
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clash between the privacy interests of the [patients], and the 
non-discriminatory principle of Title VII." Gunther v. Iowa State 
Men's Reformatory, 612 F.2d 1079, 1086 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 
466 U.S. 966, 100 S. Ct. 2942 (1980).  See Hardin v. Stynchcomb, 
691 F.2d 1364, 1369 (11th Cir. 1982).   
 
B. 
 With these precepts in mind, we may now turn to the 
facts of this case.  The "essence" of Southwood's business is to 
treat emotionally disturbed and sexually abused adolescents and 
children. Southwood has presented expert testimony that staffing 
both males and females on all shifts is necessary to provide 
therapeutic care. "Role modeling," including parental role 
modeling, is an important element of the staff's job, and a male 
is better able to serve as a male role model than a female and 
vice versa.  A balanced staff is also necessary because children 
who have been sexually abused will disclose their problems more 
easily to a member of a certain sex, depending on their sex and 
the sex of the abuser.  If members of both sexes are not on a 
shift, Southwood's inability to provide basic therapeutic care 
would hinder the "normal operation" of its "particular business."  
Therefore, it is reasonably necessary to the normal operation of 
Southwood to have at least one member of  each sex available to 
the patients at all times. 
 There is authority for the proposition that a business 
that has as its "essence" a therapeutic mission requires the 
consideration of gender in making employment decisions.  In City 
10 
of Philadelphia v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission, 300 
A.2d 97 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1973), the court determined that gender 
may be considered in order to treat and supervise children with 
emotional and social problems, and approved the youth center's 
gender-based staffing policy under the BFOQ defense.  The City of 
Philadelphia court stated that "[i]t is common sense that a young 
girl with a sexual or emotional problem will usually approach 
someone of her own sex, possibly her mother, seeking comfort and 
answers."  Id. at 103.  Similarly, in Torres v. Wisconsin 
Department of Health and Social Services, 859 F.2d 1523 (7th Cir. 
1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1017, 109 S. Ct. 1133, and 489 U.S. 
1082, 109 S. Ct. 1537 (1989), the court determined that the 
essence of a maximum security prison was rehabilitation.  The 
Torres court remanded the case to the district court for further 
fact-finding based on expert opinion and common-sense 
understanding of penal conditions in order to determine whether a 
female-only staffing policy was necessary to the institution's 
goal of rehabilitation.  Still, the Torres court held that a 
maximum security prison's policy of employing only female 
corrections officers for the female inmates' living quarters 
could be justified to achieve the institution's rehabilitative 
mission.  One of the reasons for the decision was the fact that a 
high percentage of female inmates had been physically and 
sexually abused by males.  In this case, Southwood has 
established a basis in fact through expert opinion that the 
therapeutic aspects of the child care specialist job require the 
consideration of gender. 
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 In addition to therapeutic goals, privacy concerns 
justify Southwood's discriminatory staffing policy.  Southwood 
established that adolescent patients have hygiene, menstrual, and 
sexuality concerns which are discussed more freely with a staff 
member of the same sex.  Child patients often must be accompanied 
to the bathroom, and sometimes must be bathed.  The Supreme Court 
has explicitly left open the question whether sex constitutes a 
BFOQ when privacy interests are implicated, Johnson Controls, 
Inc., 499 U.S. at 206 n.4, 111 S. Ct. 1207, and the issue has 
been raised but not yet decided by our court.  See Rider v. 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 850 F.2d 982 (3d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 488 U.S. 993, 109 S. Ct. 556 (1988).  We note that other 
circuits have discussed privacy concerns as the basis of a BFOQ 
defense.  However, those cases involve an inmate's right to 
privacy which is balanced against the state's legitimate 
penological interest.  See Nina Jordon v. Booth Gardner et. al., 
986 F.2d 1521, 1524 (9th Cir. 1993) ("prisoners' legitimate 
expectations of bodily privacy from persons of the opposite sex 
are extremely limited"); Kent v. Johnson, 821 F.2d 1220, 1226 
(6th Cir. 1987) (balancing privacy interests of inmates with 
state's interest in prison security); Gunther v. Iowa State Men's 
Reformatory, 612 F.2d 1079, 1086 (8th Cir. 1980) (same).    
 In the non-prison context, other courts have held that 
privacy concerns may justify a discriminatory employment policy. 
See AFSCME v. Michigan Council 25, 635 F. Supp. 1010 (E.D. Mich. 
1986) (privacy rights of mental health patients can justify a 
BFOQ to provide for same-sex personal hygiene care); Fesel v. 
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Masonic Home of Delaware, 447 F. Supp. 1346, 1353 (D. Del. 1978) 
(retirement home patients), aff'd mem., 591 F.2d 1334 (3d Cir. 
1979); Backus v. Baptist Medical Center, 510 F. Supp. 1191 (E.D. 
Ark. 1981) (essence of obstetrics nurse's business is to provide 
sensitive care for patient's intimate and private concerns), 
vacated as moot, 671 F.2d 1100 (8th Cir. 1982).  Even in the 
prison context, one court of appeals has held that privacy 
concerns may be the basis for excluding male corrections officers 
from female inmate living quarters.  See Torres, 859 F.2d at 1531 
("the presence of unrelated males in living spaces where intimate 
bodily functions take place is a cause of stress to females").   
 We conclude that due to both therapeutic and privacy 
concerns, Southwood is an institution in which the sexual 
characteristics of the employee are crucial to the successful 
performance of the job of child care specialist.  Southwood 
cannot rearrange job responsibilities in order to spare Healey or 
another female from working the night shift because at least one 
female and male should be available at all times in order for 
Southwood to conduct its business.  Accordingly, we hold that the 
essence of Southwood's business would be impaired if it could not 
staff at least one male and female child care specialist on each 
shift.     
 Healey argues that Patrice Michalski's affidavit raises 
a genuine doubt as to the legitimacy of Southwood's BFOQ defense, 
and that the district court erred in weighing one expert's 
testimony over another.  We disagree.  Michalski's affidavit 
states that gender does not play a role in her staff's ability to 
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provide necessary care to her patients at Merck Multiple 
Disabilities Program at the Western Psychiatric Institute.  Merck 
treats mentally retarded patients ranging from three to twenty-
four years old whose developmental age is lower than their 
chronological age. Southwood's mission, in contrast, is to treat 
emotionally disturbed and sexually abused children and 
adolescents.  Southwood's therapeutic mission depends on subtle 
interactions such as "role modeling" rather than the more 
concrete behavior modification techniques practiced at Merck.  
Therefore, the "essence" of the two institutions' business 
operations is different.  Michalski's affidavit expresses no 
opinion on the staffing policies at Southwood or another 
institution like it which treats emotionally disturbed children 
and adolescents.   
 Moreover, to the extent that the missions of the two 
institutions overlap, such as when a Merck patient is "acting out 
sexually," or has been sexually abused, Michalski states that the 
gender of the staff will be considered in treating that patient. 
We conclude that Michalski's affidavit is not relevant to the 
central issue; namely, whether the essence of Southwood's 
business would be undermined if it could not consider sex in its 
staffing policy.  Therefore, it does not create a disputed issue 
of material fact. 
 Healey also argues that qualified health care 
professionals are able to care for patients of either sex, and 
therefore consideration of one's gender is not necessary.  Healey 
does not provide any expert opinion or other evidence to support 
14 
this assertion, and our independent review of the record finds 
none.  We acknowledge that Healey's assertion has some surface 
appeal, and in most cases, men and women should be given the 
opportunity to perform a job for which each is equally capable 
and qualified.  In fact, Title VII gives women the choice to take 
jobs that historically had been restricted by an employer's 
professed concern for women's health and well-being, which 
actually were based on gender stereotypes.  See, e.g., Johnson 
Controls, 499 U.S. at 200, 111 S. Ct. at 1204.  However, in some 
limited instances, the continued vitality of a business operation 
requires the employer to consider sex in its employment 
decisions.  Such is the case here.   
 The district court erred in placing the burden of proof 
on Healey to establish that Southwood's BFOQ defense was 
pretextual.  Southwood has the burden of proof in establishing a 
BFOQ defense.  Id.  The district court determined that Southwood 
met its burden of production in presenting a BFOQ defense.  We 
recognize that the burden of production under the McDonnell 
Douglas test is a lower standard than that required to establish 
a BFOQ defense.  Nevertheless, we will affirm the district 
court's grant of summary judgment in the particular circumstances 
of this case because Southwood has provided an overwhelming 
"basis in fact" for its BFOQ defense, and Healey has presented no 
evidence that creates a disputed issue of fact. 
 
IV. 
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 We conclude that Southwood has established a BFOQ which 
justifies its discriminatory employment practice.  Accordingly, 
we will affirm the February 7, 1995, order of the district court 
granting summary judgment in favor of Southwood Psychiatric 
Hospital. 
 
                     
 
